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Is Equality Stable? 
By DILIP MOOKHERJEE AND DEBRAJ RAY* 
Economic inequality is of interest not only at 
some intrinsic level, but also for its close con- 
nections to diverse variables, ranging from 
economic indicators uch as growth rates to socio- 
political outcomes such as collective action and 
conflict. It is only natural, then, to study the 
evolution of inequality in an economic system. 
It is fair to say that the dominant view on this 
topic is that inequality is the outcome of a 
constant battle between convergence and "luck" 
(Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes, 1979). Current 
asset inequalities may echo into the future, but 
their natural tendency is to die out (owing to a 
convex investment technology). Disparities are 
only sustained through ongoing stochastic 
shocks (see also David Champernowne, 1953; 
Glenn Loury, 1981). 
A second approach emphasizes that initial 
conditions determine final outcomes, owing 
principally to a nonconvex investment technol- 
ogy (see e.g., Mukul Majumdar and Tapan 
Mitra, 1982; Abhijit Banerjee and Andrew 
Newman, 1993; Oded Galor and Joseph Zeira, 
1993; Ray and Peter Streufert, 1993). Historical 
disparities may persist and magnify, if such 
differences straddle some bifurcation threshold. 
Inequality is not inevitable in this view: stable 
steady states with inequality coexist with others 
that involve perfect equality. 
In this paper, we examine a third view which 
emphasizes an intrinsic tendency of the market 
mechanism to create inequality. In this approach, 
economic inequality appears as an inevitable out- 
come, even if all agents are identical to begin with 
and even if there is no uncertainty or technological 
nonconvexity. This view has received attention 
in Ray (1990), Debasis Bandyopadhyay (1993), 
Lars Ljungqvist (1993), Scott Freeman (1996), 
Kiminori Matsuyama (2001), and Mookherjee 
and Ray (2001). The basic argument is as follows. 
Suppose that an economy is populated by several 
dynasties, each of which allocates resources to 
current consumption and bequests to descendants. 
Assume for the moment that the latter consists 
entirely of educational expenditures preparing 
children for their chosen professions. Of course, 
the returns to such professions are endogenous; 
they depend on the distribution of individuals 
across different professions. 
Now, if several professional categories are 
necessary, wages must adjust so as to force 
separation in choices even if all individuals are 
ex ante identical. To be sure, this "broken sym- 
metry" (Matsuyama, 2002) has no payoff im- 
plications for the generation alive today; 
identical individuals must receive identical pay- 
offs. Starting with the next generation, however, 
there must be inequality (not just in wages, but 
in payoffs). There must be individuals in low- 
paying professions that involve low training 
costs, whose parents invested little; and there 
must be others in high-paying high-training- 
cost professions whose parents invested a lot. 
Once such inequality sets in, it may well mag- 
nify. Richer offspring will find it easier to invest 
in better-paying professions for their children. 
Two ingredients are used in this argument. 
First, credit markets must be missing (or imper- 
fect). Otherwise the necessary finances may be 
borrowed, and wages net of costs must be 
equalized over all professions. However, the 
assumption that parents cannot borrow against 
their children's future earnings seems innocu- 
ous enough. Second, parents cannot make fi- 
nancial bequests to supplement or substitute for 
educational expenditures. Such bequests could 
conceivably neutralize earnings inequality. This 
motivates the question: When might financial 
bequests compensate for earnings inequality in 
steady state? Moreover, starting from perfect 
equality, will equality be preserved thereafter, 
or will inequality emerge and persist? We dis- 
cuss an extended example from an ongoing 
research project. 
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I. A Dynastic Model 
Let h denote an occupation or profession. A 
collection of population weights A = { A(h) I is 
an occupational distribution. Alternatively, A is 
just a bundle of inputs, which produces a single 
final good using a convex constant-returns-to- 
scale technology. Measured in units of this 
good, occupation h costs x(h) to acquire. We 
assume that there are occupations h and h' with 
x(h) = 0 and x(h') > 0. 
Let w(h) be the wage of occupation h. The 
collection w = {w(h)} is a wage function. 
Under fairly innocuous smoothness conditions, 
for each occupational distribution A there is a 
unique "supporting" wage function w (i.e., A 
maximizes profits given w). Conversely, every 
w admits some shift w + k corresponding to 
which a unique profit-maximizing occupa- 
tional distribution A exists. We retain these 
assumptions. 
Suppose that each dynasty has a single indi- 
vidual at any date. She has resources (or wealth) 
W from two sources: a market-determined wage 
that depends on her profession, and financial 
assets that represent the (interest-updated) result 
of any financial bequest. In turn, she allocates W 
to current consumption c, a financial bequest b, 
and training costs x(h) for her child's future 
occupation h. We assume that financial be- 
quests yield some exogenous rate of interest r, 
perhaps the going rate on a world financial 
market.1 As already noted, we impose the con- 
dition that b - 0; the parent cannot borrow 
against the child's future assets. 
The resulting wealth of the child will be W' 
(1 + r)b + w'(h), where w' is next genera- 
tion' s wage function. Assume that a parent 
derives utility from her own consumption and 
the wealth of her child, and write this as u(c) + 
v(W'), where u and v are increasing, smooth, 
strictly concave utility indicators. This is what 
one might call a warm-glow specification.2 
We now define an equilibrium. Initially, each 
dynasty i is "allocated" an occupation and fi- 
nancial assets. An equilibrium describes an en- 
tire sequence of such allocations. At each date, 
the allocation determines an occupational dis- 
tribution At, as well as the (supporting) wage 
function wt. Each individual must find her de- 
cisions to be optimal, given her budget. More 
formally, dynasty i's wealth at date t will be 
given by Wt(i) = bt_1(i)(1+r) + w,(h,(i)). 
Given this wealth, i chooses (ct, bt, ht+]) to 
maximize 
(1) u(ct) + v(bt(I + r) + wt+1(ht+l)) 
subject to 
(2) ct + x(ht + 1) + bt = Wt (i). 
In turn, these choices must aggregate to the 
economy-wide distribution at every date. 
An equilibrium is a steady state if the joint 
distribution of financial wealth and occupations 
(and therefore the wage function) is unchanged 
over time. In principle, a steady state could be 
associated with wealth changes over time within 
dynasties, but a "single-crossing argument" estab- 
lishing the monotonicity of parental bequests in 
wealth rules this out. A constant distribution im- 
plies zero wealth mobility (Mookherjee and Ray, 
2001). 
In what follows, we assume that all profes- 
sions are occupied in equilibrium. This restric- 
tion, while not necessary for the results, 
simplifies the exposition greatly.3 
II. Is Equality Stable? 
A. Preliminaries 
To develop useful notation, consider a bench- 
mark model with no choice of occupations. 
There is a constant wage w at every date, and 
only financial bequests are permitted. Then, 
given resources W, an individual will choose b 
to maximize u(W - b) + v(W'), where W' - 
[1 + r]b + w. Define T(W, w) to be the 
resulting choice of W'. 
Of course, T is a nondecreasing function of W. 
To illustrate using an example with constant- ' One can allow for a closed market in which the interest 
rate is determined endogenously, but in the interests of 
brevity we do not do that here. 
2 We eschew dynastic preferences here for simplicity of 
exposition, but we address this case in our general research 
project. 
3 The existence of some occupational diversity will suf- 
fice, though we indicate an important qualification later. 
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elasticity preferences, assume that v equals Su 
for some discount factor 8 and u(c) = cI - / 
(1 - o-) for some o- > 0. Then, 
(I1+r)p p 
P (W, w) w I + p + r 1 + p + r 
if pW ' w, and equals w otherwise, where p 
[8(1 + r)]11'. 
In addition, if the persistence coefficient, de- 
fined by the increase in next period's assets 
following a unit change in assets today, is 
bounded above by unity, then for any given w, 
T( * , w) intersects the 450 line once and only 
once. This condition plays a central role in 
conventional models of convergence (e.g., 
Becker and Tomes, 1979) and is supported by a 
substantial empirical literature (see e.g., Casey 
Mulligan, 1997; Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis, 2001). We impose it here as well and 
refer to it as the imperfect persistence assump- 
tion. In the constant-elasticity example, imper- 
fect persistence is satisfied if and only if 
(3) p--[8(1 + r)]"0' < 1+- r 
Under this assumption, the policy function 
precipitates a unique limit wealth fl(w). In the 
example with (3) satisfied, fl(w) = w if p ' 1, 
and equals (pI[l - r(p - 1)])w otherwise. 
B. Steady States with Inequality 
Consider a special wage function w* such 
that w*(h) - w*(h') = (1 + r)[x(h) - 
x(h')] for every pair of occupations h and h', 
and shifted suitably so that it can serve as a 
supporting wage function for some occupa- 
tional distribution. Because the technology is 
constant returns to scale, there is, of course, a 
unique wage function of this form. Let w* be the 
lowest wage in w*, and wi* be the highest wage. 
PROPOSITION 1: As long as 
(4) w* (* 
every steady state must involve (utility) in- 
equality. If (4) fails, a steady state with per- 
fect equality exists and must display the wage 
function w*. 
This proposition is extremely general in that it 
relies on very few restrictions on preferences 
and technology. We sketch the argument 
briefly. In an equal steady state (with all pro- 
fessions occupied), the rate of return on educa- 
tion must everywhere equal r: it must obviously 
be at least r everywhere, and if it strictly ex- 
ceeds r somewhere, some occupations with 
lower training costs will not be chosen. This 
shows that an equal steady-state wage function 
must be given by w*. In addition, earning dif- 
ferentials must be perfectly offset by differences 
in financial bequests. If all households have the 
same resources W, someone earning w must 
receive a financial bequest b(w) = (W - w)I 
(1 + r). The smallest bequest must be received 
by the individual with the largest earnings. 
Since bequests must be nonnegative, W cannot 
fall short of wv*. But W is just fl(w*), because 
all rates of return equal r. Hence, condition (4) 
must be violated. 
Conversely, if (4) fails, equal steady states 
exist. Select the wage function w*, and spread 
the labor force out over different occupations in 
the proportions demanded by w*. Allow all 
parents to make bequests that will ensure that 
their children attain the same wealth fl(w*). 
The failure of (4) tells us that such bequests will 
indeed be willingly made and will compensate 
completely for earning differences, resulting in 
perfect equality in consumption and utilities. To 
be sure, such steady states may coexist with 
others that display inequality, though this is 
unlikely to happen with a sufficiently rich pro- 
fessional structure (see Section II-C). 
What sorts of configurations favor (4)? Es- 
sentially these require that the bequest motive 
not be so strong as to overwhelm all earning 
differences. For instance, if 8(1 + r) ' 1 in the 
constant-elasticity case, fl(w) must equal w, 
and so (4) must hold. Of perhaps greater interest 
is the fact that (4) applies to economies with a 
wide variety of occupations or, more precisely, 
to occupational structure that exhibit large dif- 
ferences in training costs. In such economies, 
equilibrium earnings differentials will be too 
wide to be spanned by financial bequests. Like- 
wise, equality is less likely to be sustainable in 
poor countries, for the imperfect-persistence 
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FIGURE 1. A STEADY-STATE WAGE FUNCTION 
assumption implies that uniform increases in 
wages will result in more than proportionate 
increases in the corresponding wealth levels, 
making it more likely that (4) will hold. On the 
other hand, higher growth rates may be less 
conducive to equality. For instance, suppose 
that there is Hicks-neutral technical progress so 
that in a steady state, all wages grow at the same 
rate (given some occupational distribution). 
With faster growth in wages, bequest levels will 
be reduced (though they will of course grow at 
the same rate as wages in steady state). This 
increases the possibility that a condition analo- 
gous to (4) will hold, and provides a novel 
connection between growth and inequality. 
C. Many Occupations 
Consider the special case of a "rich" set of 
occupations. This case is especially important, 
as it permits "small" movements in occupa- 
tional structure at all cost levels and therefore 
removes the indivisibilities built in by assump- 
tion in many existing models (see the discussion 
in Mookherjee and Ray [2001]). 
Assume a continuum of occupations, with 
training costs in some interval [0, M]. Fig- 
ure 1 depicts a steady-state wage function with 
the lowest wage equal to w. Across occupations 
with wages between w and fl(w), wages must 
be linear in costs with slope (1 + r), for 
individuals will climb to wealth fl(w) on the 
strength of financial bequests alone. If, in this 
range, some occupation h affords a higher mar- 
ginal return than the financial rate, some set of 
professions below h must remain unoccupied. 
Define x by w(xk) = (w). (There may not 
exist such a point, in which case the steady state 
involves perfect equality.) Now, the financial 
rate of return alone will be insufficient to main- 
tain individuals beyond x. To encourage the 
settlement of such occupations, the rate of re- 
turn on occupational choice must depart from 
the financial rate at this point. This departure 
must create inequality: dynasties in "higher" 
occupations will enjoy strictly higher lifetime 
utility than their counterparts below x. 
Notice that both financial and educational 
bequests are made at the bottom of the occupa- 
tional ladder, in the region between 0 and r. As 
we move into the higher-occupation categories, 
financial bequests are apparently shut down, 
and all intergenerational transfers are made via 
educational choices.4 One should be careful 
with this interpretation. An "occupation" may 
well be an financial category with setup costs. 
With this broad interpretation, financial be- 
quests (at higher rates of return than r) may 
coexist with educational choices as we move 
beyond x. 
The continuum structure displays an interest- 
ing feature: the steady state is unique.5 To see 
this, Figure 1 depicts (by way of contradiction) 
a second hypothetical steady state as a dotted 
line. Note that the two wage functions must 
cross; otherwise, by constant returns to scale, 
one of them cannot support profit-maximization. 
Suppose that the two functions intersect at x*. 
As far as an individual with wealth w(x*) is 
concerned, the original steady-state function en- 
courages her to choose a total wealth of w(x*) 
for her child as well. But then at the second 
steady state, she must want to move her descen- 
dant strictly upward in wealth space, a contra- 
diction to the zero-mobility property of steady 
states. 
4In part, this observation hinges on the richness of the 
set of occupations. If there are "gaps" between occupations, 
some financial bequests may be observed in this region as 
well. 
5This result does depend on the postulate that all pro- 
fessions are occupied. If there are "gaps" in equilibrium 
occupational structure, multiple steady states may exist. 
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Notice as a corollary that if (4) fails, then 
equality is the unique steady-state outcome.6 
D. Equilibrium Dynamics 
We now turn to the question of dynamics. 
The basic ideas are simple, though the details 
are complicated and thus suppressed here. A 
distribution of wealth (past bequests plus cur- 
rent income) prevails at any date; this will map 
into a distribution of wealth for the next gener- 
ation. Of course, the analysis will be different 
depending on whether condition (4) holds or 
fails, and in addition there are several different 
kinds of initial conditions to consider. We re- 
port on a single case, but one that holds partic- 
ular interest. We assume that initial wealth is 
perfectly equally distributed, yet we suppose 
that a steady state is incompatible with perfect 
equality [i.e., that (4) holds]. 
Begin, then, with a single wealth level which 
we shall call WO, commonly held by every 
member of generation 0. The key to understand- 
ing the dynamics is the following simple but 
powerful observation. 
Observation 1: Suppose that next period's 
wage function is given by wl, with lowest wage 
wl. Let W1 --(WO, wl). Then for every x 
such that wI (x) ' W1, it must be the case that 
wl(x) = w, + (1 + r)x. 
This follows from the argument described in 
Section II-C: the rate of return on educational 
investment must equal r over the entire range 
spanned by financial bequests for any given 
occupation. Observation 1 has an interesting 
corollary. 
Observation 2: For any N, there exists a thresh- 
old such that, starting from any equal initial 
wealth above this threshold, there is perfect 
equality for at least N generations. 
To see this, recall the wage function w* con- 
structed to state Proposition 1. For any N, define 
a threshold (call it WV), such that if WO ' W, 
then P(N)(WO, w*) ' w*, where T(N) is the 
function T iterated N times. In words, we 
choose an initial wealth high enough so that N 
iterations will not suffice to bring wealth down 
to w*, in the pure bequest model with baseline 
wage w*. If the wage function for the next N 
periods is given by w*, this is perfectly consis- 
tent with equilibrium behavior for those N pe- 
riods. All occupations are equally valuable, so 
individuals are indifferent over these choices. 
Moreover, there will be full equality over this 
epoch. 
Observation 1 implies that this is the only 
possible outcome for the first N periods. Any 
other candidate wage function would have to 
exhibit a return of r over occupations in which 
the wage fell short of wealth. This implies right 
away that no other equilibrium wage function 
can exist with the same starting wage w*. Using 
Observation 1 again and employing an argu- 
ment similar to that used to establish uniqueness 
in Section II-C, we may also rule out any can- 
didate wage function with a different starting 
wage than w*. 
Thus, perfect equality can prevail for a sub- 
stantial number of periods. However, if (4) 
holds it cannot prevail forever. Because 
fQ(w*) < wi*, there must eventually come a 
date T when the recursion q7""(Wo, w*) dips 
below wi*. At this stage, the symmetry of equi- 
librium is broken, and the economy must depart 
from the wage function w*. If not, all occupa- 
tions with wages that exceed q/(7"(Wo, w*) 
would remain unoccupied. This cannot be: the 
wages of such occupations must rise, yielding 
rates of return that exceed their counterpart on 
financial bequests. For all other occupations, 
Observation 1 is applicable in full force, and the 
occupational rate of return remains anchored to 
the financial rate. 
Figure 2 describes the resulting "distortion" 
in the wage function. The diagram displays N 
initial periods in which the wage function w* 
prevails, and there is no inequality. At date N, 
wealth dips into the support of w*, and no 
occupation more expensive than XN can be sup- 
ported under the old rates of return. The econ- 
omy must react by lowering the wages of all 
occupations below XN, and by raising the rates 
of return to all other occupations. These higher 
rates encourage the acquisition of such profes- 
sions and in so doing must generate inequality. 
6 If the number of occupations is finite, there may be 
multiple steady states. For a fuller account of the connection 
between multiplicity of steady states and richness of occu- 
pational structure, see Mookhejee and Ray (2001). 
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FIGURE 2. SYMMETRY-BREAKING 
ALONG EQUILIBRIUM PATHS 
Of course, all generation-N individuals are still 
indifferent among the various choices; but this 
is the last generation for which all payoffs are 
equal. The higher rates of return on the more 
expensive occupations must inevitably result in 
inequality among the next generation. 
Once such inequality sets in, it will not go 
away. Familiar single-crossing arguments guar- 
antee that descendants of higher-wealth individ- 
uals must occupy the richer professions and 
receive higher payoffs. The subsequent dynam- 
ics are complicated by the fact that the wealth 
distribution is no longer degenerate. In the spe- 
cial case where there are just two occupations 
(involving different training costs), it can be 
shown that the economy converges to an un- 
equal steady state, with inequality rising over 
time. Moreover, the rise in inequality is aug- 
mented in the presence of financial bequests: it 
tuOs out that gneion-N in the unskilled occu- 
pation at any date are less wealthy than their 
parents and make smaller financial bequests to 
their children than they received. 
In the continuum case, the wealth distribution 
at any date must retain a mass point at its lower 
bound, andt nuis this mass point that will be 
spread over all the "low" occupations, which 
continue to bear the financial rate of return r. In 
the relatively "high" occupations, the rate of 
return will continue its departure from r, attract- 
ing more individuals into this zone. 
Figure 2 illustrates this with yet another iter- 
ation for date N + 1. The new wage function is 
given by the dashed curve. It must be linear 
(with slope 1 + r) up to the new threshold 
XN+ 1' and then it rises even more steeply than 
before, intersecting both the previous wage 
functions from below. This rise induces some 
fresh symmetry-breaking, as new dynasties 
from the "cheap" occupations seek the higher 
rates of return. If this process converges (a 
subject of our current research), it must be to 
precisely the steady state we have described 
earlier. At this steady state, there is a mass point 
of individuals with identical wealth, and among 
such individuals there is a simple trade-off be- 
tween occupational choice and financial be- 
quests, among which they are indifferent. 
However, there will also be a positive measure 
of individuals arrayed over varying levels of 
wealth (and utility). 
III. Concluding Remarks 
We have outlined an approach to studying the 
evolution of economic inequality. In this ap- 
proach, the presence of diversity of necessary 
occupations plays a crucial role. We show that, 
under fairly general conditions, ex ante identical 
individuals must behave in a nonsymmetric 
way, because different professional categories 
must be occupied for the economy to function. 
In itself, this is not "payoff-relevant" because 
the descendants of low-paying occupations can 
conceivably be compensated by financial be- 
quests left by their parents. This requires a 
sufficiently strong bequest motive relative to the 
range of earning differentials, which is unlikely 
in economies with diverse occupational struc- 
ture, with low levels of wages, or with high 
rates of wage growth. When the bequest motive 
is not so strong, economic inequality will even- 
tually tend to emerge and persist, even if all 
households start perfectly equal. 
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